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Economics of Convention 
and the History of Economies. 
Towards a Transdisciplinary Approach 
in Economic History 
Rainer Diaz-Bone & Robert Salais ∗ 
Abstract: »Économie des conventions und die Geschichte von Ökonomien. 
Perspektiven für einen transdisziplinären Ansatz in der Wirtschaftsgeschich-
te.«. This introduction and the contributions of the HSR issue intend to develop 
and to demonstrate the potentialities of the economics of convention (EC) for a 
transdisciplinary approach to the history of economies. “Convention” has be-
come a core concept in the renewal of French social sciences from structural-
ism towards pragmatism. Conventions are interpretative schemes for action 
and coordination that persons and actors use in situations under conditions of 
uncertainty. Through repeated interaction they become an intimate part of the 
history, incorporated into justifications, behaviours and social objects like in-
stitutions. In contrast to neoclassic economics and to new historical institution-
alism, the EC starts from assumptions of a plurality of economic frameworks 
of action, of the socio-historical construction of concepts, categories, and data. 
It rejects dichotomies, adopts a broad conception of the economy, conceives 
institutional change as the change of the “conventional” foundations for the 
pragmatic use and interpretation of institutions. Its methodology is that of a 
“complex pragmatist situationalism”, dedicated to a comprehensive approach 
aiming at reconstructing the internal going-on of historical processes. This spe-
cial issue offers a set of contributions on: the origins of the approach, its meth-
odological standpoint, its possible developments towards a sociology of en-
gagement or hermeneutical concerns, several applications on economic history 
(notably about conventions of quality and of labor). 
Keywords: Economics of convention, institutions, pragmatism, economic ac-
tion, situation, economic history, new historical institutionalism, justifications, 
plurality. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last decades the économie des conventions (economics of convention, in 
short EC) was developed as a transdisciplinary approach to the analysis of 
economic institutions.1 It was originally applied in the 1980s from economists 
and sociologists in studies of statistical classifications, in studies of work, labor 
markets and of labor organization, and in studies of products and product quali-
ties (Thévenot 1986; Salais and Thévenot 1986; Eymard-Duvernay 1987; Bol-
tanski and Thévenot 1989). But from its beginning, this approach was also 
developed and applied in the historical analysis of economic institutions and 
classifications (Affichard 1977, 1987; Boltanski 1982; Salais, Baverez and 
Reynaud 1986).2 In this perspective the historical interplay and the co-
construction of institutions, social categories and the pragmatics of coordina-
tion were reconstructed. This is the reason why from the beginning also histori-
ans were interested and involved in the development of the EC as a complete 
paradigm in the field of political economy.3 In the following decades research 
was applied to the whole range of socio-economic topics. Since the 1990s the 
international reception began to intensify4 and the number of contributions 
about the internal paradigmatic structure, the paradigmatic coherence and the 
development of the EC increased.5 And also since the 1990s the EC was con-
ceived as one of the main parts of the so called “new French social sciences” 
and the notion of convention became a core concept in the new French social 
sciences (Dosse 1999; Nachi 2006; Corcuff 2007). The EC postulates a prag-
matic competence of actors to coordinate their interactions to achieve a com-
mon goal (Salais and Storper 1993; Storper and Salais 1997). Actors are able to 
refer to specific socio-cultural resources to coordinate their interactions. Con-
ventions are these cultural resources. Conventions are not to be misunderstood 
as traditions, customs or mere technical standards.6 
Conventions resemble ‘hypotheses’ formulated by persons with respect to the 
relationship between their actions and the actions of those on whom they must 
depend to realize a goal. When interactions are reproduced again and again in 
similar situations, and when particular courses of action have proved success-
ful, they become incorporated in routines and we then tend to forget their ini-
                                                             
1  See for introduction Eymard-Duvernay (2006a, 2006b), Favereau and Lazega (2002), 
Orléan (2004), Salais (2007), Salais and Storper (1997), Diaz-Bone (2009a, 2011). 
2  See also the contribution from Claire Judde de Larivière and Georges Hanne (in this volume). 
3  See the contribution of Christof Jeggle (in this volume). 
4  See Wagner (1994), for an overview Diaz-Bone and Thévenot (2010).  
5  See for example Eymard-Duvernay et al. (2006, 2011), Swedberg (2006), Salais (2007), 
Jagd (2007, 2011), and Diaz-Bone (2009a). 
6  There are other approaches which refer also to the notion of convention but which differ in 
many respects from the French approach of EC. An example: a completely different ap-
proach is the modelling of conventions in game theory by Peyton Young. 
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tially hypothetical character. Conventions thus become an intimate part of the 
history incorporated in behaviors. (Storper and Salais 1997, 16) 
Conventions emerged historically from interactions wherein actors had to solve 
coordination under the condition of uncertainty on how situations, persons, 
objects can be evaluated in a shared way. Without shared evaluations no coor-
dinated collective intentionality would be possible and any interaction would 
fail. Rules and institutions are seen as incomplete, so actors have to share ways 
how to apply them and how to evaluate their appropriate interpretation. Again 
conventions are needed to achieve a shared way of interpretation and to find an 
appropriate way how to “handle” institutions and rules. This sharing of inter-
pretation does not presuppose peoples’ belonging to the same community, nor 
any categorical imperative or submission to some incorporated habitus (Livet 
1994). It basically means that, in order to successfully achieve coordination – 
which is always situated in time and space – it is enough that nothing happens 
which contradicts the assumption made by the participants that they share the 
same evaluation of the situation. Conventions are both, the precondition of 
coordination taking place as well as the outcome of coordination. Process and 
outcome are intimately intermingled.  
The EC can be regarded as a social-constructivist theory of economic action 
and economic institutions. The term “constructivist” is widely used these days 
and has become an umbrella term for many paradigms. But here it has immedi-
ate evidence as characterization, because the pragmatic basis of EC contradicts 
to paradigms which postulate given structures and qualities as a priori ontolo-
gies of the social. Instead EC regards these as a posteriori ontologies – i.e. as 
the result of foregoing processes and practices. And their reality is not external 
to these processes and actions which generated them. From this standpoint, 
institutions are seen not as exogenous to economic action, they are not pre-
given exogenous constraints. Instead they must be “enacted” by competent 
actors in real situations (Salais 1998; Bessy 2002). Whereas neo-classical the-
ory assumes qualities and rationality as given (and in their terminology as 
exogenous) EC regards qualities, cognitive formats and rationalities as depend-
ing on conventions. Here conventions become – as logics of economic coordi-
nation and evaluation – the interpretative resource on which the construction of 
qualities, cognitive formats and rationalities is grounded.  
The theoretical work of Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) became an impor-
tant foundation for the EC.7 Boltanski and Thévenot identified a plurality of 
conventions which evolved in the course of the socio-cultural evolution. Such 
                                                             
7  This book was published in France the first time in 1987 (Boltanski and Thévenot 1987). It 
was published again (by another publisher) in France in 1991 (Boltanski and Thévenot 
1991). Translations were published almost two decades later. An English translation was 
published in 2006 (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) and a German translation was published 
in 2007 (Boltanski and Thévenot 2007). 
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evolution was driven by actors who intentionally seek to solve problems which 
arise in the process of economic coordination and the processes of production 
and distribution. The consequence from the viewpoint of the EC is that there is 
a plurality of possible pragmatic logics for economic coordination among many 
others. Robert Salais and Michael Storper continued this theoretical perspective 
and worked out their influential approach of economic action frameworks and 
possible economic worlds of economic coordination (Salais and Storper 1993; 
Storper and Salais 1997). Real economic worlds are combinations (as compro-
mises or as conflicts) of conventions. The market convention (or market world) 
is only one possible convention for economic coordination. The EC identified 
up to a dozen of possible conventions. In economies all conventions are exist-
ing principles as the industrial convention, the ecologic convention, the inter-
personal convention, the domestic convention, the civic convention, the net-
work convention and others. Every empirically existing market and every 
empirically existing productive organization combine a plurality of these con-
ventions. For the EC it is impossible to reduce the sphere of the economy to a 
single logic of action – as neo-classical economic theory does. 
2. Economist’s Perspectives on Economic History 
The EC aims at linking analysis of discourses and concepts with the approach 
of social practices; it has also a broad understanding of economic phenomena 
(Favereau 1986; Bessy and Favereau 2003; Eymard-Duvernay 2009; Diaz-
Bone 2009b). In contrast to mainstream economics, the EC intends to meet the 
two criteria that the economic historian Jürgen Kocka recently claimed for a 
renewing of economic history which could also be a renewed basis for a fruit-
ful cooperation between history (especially economic history) and social sci-
ences.  
First, discourse and conceptual history must be linked to the history of prac-
tices, which is difficult to achieve. Secondly, economic history benefits only if 
it adopts a broad understanding of its tasks and does not restrict itself to eco-
nomic matters in the narrow sense, for instance its use of efficiency. (Kocka 
2010, 53) 
There are competitors whom one can meet on the road towards historians, the 
several neo-institutionalisms which emerged from the pioneer works of Ronald 
H. Coase (the transaction costs) and Oliver E. Williamson (the close relation-
ship between asset specifities and structures of governance).8 The most talented 
challenger, with no doubt, is Douglass C. North and his approach to economic 
history. 
                                                             
8  See Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985, 2000). 
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The specificity and novelty of the North program consisted in reframing the 
theoretical resources provided both by the transaction cost approach and the 
rational choice theories and making them more fitted to the existence of institu-
tions and their role on economic change and dynamics. To do so, North has 
largely neglected the concept of governance and the rigid links established by 
Williamson between the degree of asset specifity and the mode of governance 
(Williamson 1985). He has redirected the concept of transaction cost towards a 
theory of exchange which details several types of exchange (from the local and 
personalized one to the most impersonal – in some parallel with the plurality of 
forms of coordination proper to the EC). He criticizes the rational choice 
school for its reluctance to accept that “institutions do exist” and for its narrow 
approach to individual rationality to which he prefers a (to some extent) cogni-
tion-based conceptualization. On this, Douglass C. North as well as (in 1986) 
the founders of the economics of convention built on (although differently) the 
theoretical opportunities offered since the 1960s by the analysis of problems of 
micro-coordination, thanks to the rupture it represented with regards to macro-
historical and structural analysis.  
Close comparison between the new historical institutionalism (in short NHI) 
– as framed by North in his seminal 1990 book “Institutions, institutional 
change and economic performance” (North 1990) and continued in his 2005 
book “Understand the process of institutional change” (North 2005) – and the 
economics of convention (EC) reveals some parallels, if not resemblances, but 
deep core differences as well. The reader, one can guess, will become aware of 
them along this issue. Let us begin by parallels and then come to basic differ-
ences. 
Both approaches have the same general interest in institutions and the role 
of cognition in economic matters, though in their own way as we will see. But 
parallels go further into details. Douglass C. North has a true concern with 
individual perceptions which, as he said, “are a function of the way the mind 
interprets the information it receives. The mental constructs individuals form to 
explain and interpret the world around them” contribute to shape their choices 
(North 1993, 2). At first glance, this resembles to the way the EC considers 
conventions: depending on the authors, mutual expectations, assumptions 
within action with regard to possible worlds, models of representation, collec-
tive cognitive arrangements, etc. Conventions are present in North’s construc-
tion as a specific kind among a variety of institutions and are classified under 
the label of “informal constraints”. North is aware of possible interactions 
between norms and, more generally, “informal constraints” and formal rules, 
and of their impact on economic performance; which ressembles interactions 
between conventions and institutions considered by the EC. While the EC 
understands institutions as multi-layered sediments of conventions, the NHI 
does not neglect the possibility that, somewhere, institutions could be seen “as 
an extension of the mental constructs which the human mind develops to inter-
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pret the environment of the individual” (North 1993, 7). Facing the same chal-
lenge, the long-term stability of institutional systems and the fact that, most 
often, only incremental changes are feasible, the NHI and EC come to evaluate 
the role of informal constraints (respectively conventions) to stabilize institu-
tional sets; and, too, that institutional change becomes effective only when 
informal constraints (resp. conventions) more or less fit with it. And that may 
be more … up to the point of wondering about the undertaking of a possibly 
fruitful dialogue at three: history, economics of convention and new historical 
institutionalism. 
Could historians consider the choice between makes no difference in re-
search outcomes? Could they simply link their choice to the nature of their 
object, economically dominant for the NHI, socially incline for the EC? That 
would be neglecting the impact of foundations and methodologies sincerely 
foreign to each other. Basically, the NHI aims at pushing the integration the 
farthest possible of new preoccupations (cognition activities of agents, limits of 
rationality, taking institutions seriously, understanding the long run stability of 
economic trajectories, and the difficulty to change institutional settings) with-
out putting into question the “fundamentals” of mainstream economics. What 
the EC does is to face the challenge to rebuild these fundamentals in order to 
provide these preoccupations with solid and realistic foundations; and not the 
least to meet other social sciences and implement interdisciplinary work. 
There are, at least, three premises to investigate which are basically different 
between NHI and EC. All revolve around the theoretical comprehension of 
what institutions do and of where they come from. The first premise is about 
the articulation and dynamic interaction between conventions (that EC does not 
assimilate to a kind of institutions at the difference of NHI) and institutions. 
The second one concerns the overall architecture: the NHI starts, curiously 
(considering its ambitions) from a holistic regulative conception of the archi-
tecture; the EC starts from coordination as a situated pragmatism in a horizon-
tal as well as bottom-up conception of economic development. Institutional 
architecture is not pre-given, instead permanently built and rebuilt through 
interaction and interpretation. The third one is about the theoretical status of 
objects and, consequently, of persons. In NHI (as in mainstream economics) 
objects are reduced to their intrinsic physical properties and persons to the use 
of instrumental rationality dedicated to such objects (even values are consid-
ered under such angle). EC is mostly considering people through their produc-
tive projects in the general sense of realization processes in life and work. For 
EC such projects have a wider coherence, simultaneously material, cognitive 
and in some way intentional (in a weak sense). It follows that people have 
agencies which are, by necessity, anchored in social and historical contexts. 
They are not, properly speaking, embedded in something external, but are co-
producing themselves and their world. 
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2.1 Conventions and/or Institutions 
Like Kenneth Arrow (1951), North is using convention in the narrow sense of 
old social customs economics unfortunately has to deal with. One cannot over-
look their influence, but in no case could they belong to the realm of econo- 
mics. EC is working the other way. Following the linguistic, then pragmatic 
turns, it considers that conventions invade everyday life, in economic coordina-
tion as elsewhere. It is easy for everybody to observe their omnipresence on 
markets, on firms or, more generally in production networks, in sectors, in 
financial markets, or around the realization of complex products involving a lot 
of actors dispersed around the world for instance. How could such actors coor-
dinate without having something in common, namely conventions defining the 
quality of the product, its pieces, the way they have to fit together? Information 
on prices is not enough.9 Without conventions of quality and agreement on 
them among participants, the market could not work neither would the produc-
tion process.  
Conventions run the economic process in its dynamics, not institutions. 
They do so through mutual expectations between participants, the building of 
common knowledge; they serve as reciprocal references to evaluate whether 
the actions of others follow the path we expect they will do. Such conventions 
are multidimensional. They underline discourses of justifications, especially in 
case of disputes or deliberation. But, too, they guide practices as frameworks 
that allow overcoming uncertainty because participants have a reasonable con-
fidence that others will follow the same guide; or if not, they would have a way 
to assess others do not respect it. So the EC has taken on board – as we said 
before – since its beginning the requirements underlined by Jürgen Kocka 
(2010). 
One can say that conventions also work as practical norms. There is no need 
to bring disputes to a court; it is often sufficient that signals are sent by others 
to manifest they consider to deviate from their expectations, or to remind the 
necessity to maintain one’s reputation for remaining on the market. All in all, 
the repeated use of conventions in daily coordination contributes to build and 
shape what one can call the practical knowledge of individuals and actors. 
They rely on such knowledge; they use it to test institutions, to protest or to 
                                                             
9  Imagine that a supplier of cast-iron pieces for car motors decides to substitute, say, tin to 
cast-iron, because he could lower his prices and then win new clients (which is the way 
mainstream economics basically considers market competition). It would not be long for 
him to be expulsed from that market, because he does not any more respect the conventions 
of quality at work in the industry. Conventions of quality are prior to any market, and 
emerge from progressive agreement between their actors. Competition is, above all, over 
quality; hence the strategic importance to be the first to elaborate the future standards. See 
the contributions of Philippe Minard, Bert De Munck, and Christof Jeggle on conventions 
of quality and worlds of production (in this volume). 
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play the game. Such practical knowledge, largely autonomously built, is the 
very basis of the functioning of democracy. Basically we sustain in this issue 
that conventions have antecedence over institutions in socioeconomic, as well 
as political processes, and we claim the need to undertake convention-based 
socio-history.  
This is not to say that institutions do not matter. Institutions matter, too. But 
the way NHI formalizes them and their connection to conventions is very de-
ceptive, when considering how economies are going on, nowadays and in the 
past. We come here to our second point. 
2.2 The Dynamic Interaction between Conventions and Institutions 
The key words in NHI when considering the role of institutions are “constraint” 
and “incentive”: “Institutions are the constraints that human beings impose on 
human interaction”; even conventions are considered as “informal constraints” 
(North 1993, 1). NHI allows some feed-back from organizations to alter the 
rules of institutions, which contributes to institutional change. But the process 
of constraints and incentives dominates and is going down towards individuals, 
with organizations as intermediaries. Such a view is, above all, dogmatically 
normative; it does not fit in particular, even for a while, to globalized econo-
mies. It is better to have a more open and internal judgment rather than to ex 
ante evaluate, and from the external, what is going on. In a globalization con-
text, markets and worldwide processes of production rely almost exclusively on 
conventions between actors. Transcription of them into international or national 
private law instruments are used to prevent or organize disputes that may arise. 
But these instruments do not constitute the very matter of what is at stake; such 
role is fulfilled by the conventions that are shared by actors depending on their 
markets, professions or sectors. Basically global actors pass over existing insti-
tutions, national or international.  
Hence in the EC view, instead of viewing institutions as devices for “politi-
cal control” over rational individuals, one should consider what empirical in-
teractions develop between conventions and institutions. Institutions have to 
pass the test of the existing conventions and, at the end, should be analyzed as 
multilayered-sedimentations of conventions. Institutions aim at inscribing 
general principles of justice and ethics into conventional spaces which can no 
longer (and even not in the long run) act as if they ignore such inscription. But 
convention-based practices permanently remind to institutions that their legiti-
macy and effectiveness are only obtained when they, their rules and objectives, 
begin to be part of actors’ expectations as framed by the conventions they use.10 
Institutional changes arise for EC from the interplay of horizontal coordination 
in which actors in situation have to deal with a plurality of conventions and to 
                                                             
10  More is said in the contribution of Robert Salais (in this volume). 
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cope with conflicts and compromises between them, and of vertical coordina-
tion coming from the different levels (from personal engagement to state – 
oriented coordination and evaluation) and the conflicting orientations they 
assign to collective action. 
2.3 Objects and Persons 
The third premise to discuss is the theoretical status of objects and – conse-
quently – of persons. Here another theoretical and methodological innovation 
comes from EC which – as we believe – offers long run perspective for histori-
ans: the use of a pragmatist approach. The standard view from Herbert Simon 
to NHI (that could be found also in Marxist vulgate or in positivism) is to 
maintain objects and persons external to each others. As we mentioned earlier, 
objects are reduced to their intrinsic physical properties and persons to the use 
of instrumental rationality dedicated to such objects.  
The purpose of the EC is to overcome this dichotomy and to discover how 
objects and persons could be said as belonging to the same world, especially to 
the same possible world.11 Pragmatism rejects dualisms;12 its use by EC builds 
a bridge with initial investments made by Luc Boltanski, Alain Desrosières, 
Robert Salais and Laurent Thévenot in the history of social categories (like 
nomenclatures of social groups or the category unemployment) which prepared 
the emergence of EC. The bridge sheds light on the concept of “qualification” 
in its core meaning of providing quality to something or to somebody. This 
operation is not merely cognitive, but appears to be fundamental for any insti-
tutional change. Indeed it belongs to language exchanges and to the implement-
ing of theoretical discourses into current practices, but it goes well beyond. To 
be achieved, qualification requires investments of form dedicated to it 
(Thévenot 1983) and, much wider, a socio-historical process of material and 
institutional change that, as in case of the category unemployment (Salais 1986, 
2007a, 2007b), has run from the organization of firms towards the domain of 
public policies, law and the shaping of individual and collective expectations. 
When such a process is achieved, one can observe an overall coherence (or 
compatibility) between the qualifying of objects, persons and institutions that 
allow them to participate in the same world.  
Not only NHI missed such understanding of institutional change, but, worse 
with regards to its project, it let aside the lessons brought about change by 
industrial economics in its institutionalist version of the 1970s and 1980s. We 
are thinking here of works from Michael Piore, Bengt-Ake Lundvall, Georges 
Richardson, Richard Langlois, Arndt Sorge or Dominique Foray, to speak of 
                                                             
11  But not equivalent as Bruno Latour and Michel Callon advocate for in their actor-network 
theory (ANT). 
12  More in the contribution of Diaz-Bone and Thévenot (2010). 
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some.13 All have focused their attention on the substantial content and affinities 
which production processes require to be efficient between technology, cogni-
tive tools, workers, type of network between firms, public policies, and criteria 
of choice.14 The integration of these lessons in EC was one objective of Salais 
and Storper (1993; Storper and Salais 1997). Combined with the plurality as-
sumption, the way is free for richer and more realistic conceptions of both 
objects and persons. The reader will find them at work in all contributions in 
this volume, as well as innovative conceptions of conventions and institutions. 
3. EC and Economic History 
As argued above, the NHI developed some modern positions in the field of 
economic history, but kept core assumptions of neo-classical economic theory, 
which remain problematic from the standpoint of the EC. From its beginning 
the new institutional economics and NHI were critical references for the devel-
opment of this new approach (Bessy 2002; Dequech 1997; Thévenot 1989; 
Eymard-Duvernay 1989, 2002, 2011). What are the main positions and meth-
odological postulates for the economic history, which are brought in by EC? 
3.1 Analysis of Economic Performance through Time 
Douglass C. North defined the task of economic history. For him, “economic 
history is about the performance of economies through time” (North 1994, 
359). The core argument of his approach is that culture and belief system can 
impede or enhance economic efficiency. Economic development therefore can 
be understood as the process of the development of institutions which reduce 
transaction costs. Then the performance of the economy will also develop. The 
New Institutional Economics, which is related to NHI, introduces therefore a 
model of different layers, starting with immediate transactions at the centre, 
which are accomplished by an institutional and cultural environment (William-
son 2000).  
From the perspective of EC, the main task of economic history is not to 
evaluate and benchmark institutional systems through the lenses of a prede-
fined theoretical model. It is to find the best ways and methodologies to recon-
struct historical processes of economies (see part 4 below). EC does not neglect 
performance but provides it with completely different meaning and orientation. 
These are actors who pragmatically perform the economy in a plurality of 
                                                             
13  Richardson (1972); Piore (1992); Foray and Garrouste (1990); Maurice, Sorge, and Warner 
(1980); Lundvall (1985). 
14  One could find the same underlying sources and inspiration in the contribution of Jürgen 
Kädtler when he points on the tensions between financial evaluation and the cognitive tools 
used for productive activity and labor (in this volume). 
 17
different ways. Research done in the tradition of EC does not focus on the 
reduction of transaction cost (by culture or institutions) but does focus on the 
different constellations of conventions which coexist and are viable solutions 
for the problem of economic coordination under the condition of uncertainty. 
Research often reconstructs these pluralities in comparative perspective and 
argues that efficiency and transactions cost do depend on the way conventions 
are performed in situations by competent actors. One important methodological 
position is to start from the assumption of a plurality of modes of coordination; 
it is not to evaluate non-market constellations as deviances of an optimal insti-
tutional arrangement (i.e. the perfect market itself). Another methodological 
position is to conceive the situation as unit of analysis in which all levels of 
coordination (“layers”) and relevant entities of the economy are present and 
coexisting. As introduced above, the pragmatic position of the EC rejects dual-
isms as the division of social spheres – as culture and economy –, or the differ-
entiation of levels of varying economic ranges – as transactions, institutional 
and cultural environment. Instead all relevant spheres and levels are not only 
assumed to be co-present in situations, they are simultaneously enacted and re-
enacted in situations.15  
To analyze the performance of economies therefore means analyzing inter-
acting actors in situations who try to coordinate production and evaluation. 
Focusing on problems of economic coordination in practical situations is a 
promising methodological approach to identify the relevant conventions and 
the strategic and reflexive competencies of actors. The reason is that actors are 
forced to justify themselves – as Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot demon-
strated in their study of classification practices (Boltanski and Thévenot 1983). 
To analyze the performance through time means to focus on the situational 
events that introduced a change in coordinating and justifying practices of 
actors.  
Situational coordination is stabilized by objects and cognitive formats, on 
which interactions can rely. The relevance of objects and the form of cognitive 
formats depends on conventions as well. Another promising methodological 
approach is therefore to focus on the processes of different investments in 
forms and the processes of establishing conventions and compromises between 
them (Thévenot 1984). Economics normally sees only “economic” investments 
(as the buying of machines for production or the training of workers as invest-
ment in human capital) as relevant forms of investment. But organizations have 
also to invest in cognitive instrumentations to organize and stabilize coordina-
tion. These cognitive investments do format information in a way which corre-
sponds to the relevant conventions – information is in-formatted. The historical 
                                                             
15  See for this claim, to take the situation as unit of analysis Salais and Storper (1993) resp. 
Storper and Salais (1997) and for the position of a complex methodological situationalism 
Diaz-Bone (in this volume). 
 18
study of processes of investments in new cognitive formats will discover the 
processes of the emergence of new conventions.  
3.2 Explaining Institutional Change 
It is not enough to describe the emergence of cognitive formats, of new con-
ventions and to describe the performance of actors. The explanatory power of 
the EC-approach emerges from the conceptual difference between conventions 
and institutions. The analysis of institutional change is the analysis of the 
change of the conventional foundation for the pragmatic uses of institutions in 
situations. Institutions (as rules) are created as instruments for successful coor-
dination. Conventions are the way institutions are interpreted and handled in 
situations. But the development of economic action and the consequences of 
economic coordination are confronted with radical uncertainty about future 
events and ongoing social critique. Uncertainty about future events arises be-
cause these events could change the regularities of economic coordination and 
the legitimate expectations of economic actors. Social critique can rearrange 
the legitimate order of conventions in relation to institutions.  
As Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot have stated, dynamics is also 
caused by actors who engage for a common good. This does not mean that 
actors act in an altruistic way. Every convention is closely linked to a so called 
order of justification and world (as the worlds of production). Convention-
based coordination pursues not individual and opportunistic goals but ideal 
horizons and the higher principle of a common good (Boltanski and Thévenot 
2006, 76f). The orders of worth (of persons, objects, actions) are constituted on 
the basis of higher principles. Examples are the authors, whose theories Boltan-
ski and Thévenot discussed, like Adam Smith (for the market world/market 
convention), Claude Henri Saint-Simon (for the industrial word/industrial 
convention), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (for the civic world/civic convention). The 
higher principle which is evoked in pragmatic critique makes all actors to be-
come everyday metaphysicians of the social which promote practical moralities 
in the sphere of the economy. Uncertainty and critique are the driving forces 
for a continuing tension between conventions and institutions. Actors perma-
nently have to apply their competence to judge the appropriateness of institu-
tions for means of coordination and to fix and to adjust the relation between 
conventions and institutions in the course of economic coordination to situ-
ational purposes. Institutional dynamics result from these adjusting practices 
when actors invent new relations between conventions and institutions because 
the old relations were – in their view – no longer legitimate and viable.  
Here EC differs again from NHI. For North the “agent of change is the indi-
vidual entrepreneur responding to the incentives embodied in the institutional 
framework” (North 1990, 83). The methodological individualism of NHI pos-
tulates self-centered and utility-maximizing logics of action as motives for 
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institutional change, where EC sees a plurality of moral principles as driving 
forces for institutional change.  
3.3 The “Culture and Economy”-Perspective 
Neo-classical economics was projected as a discipline of “pure economics” by 
Leon Walras in the 1870s (Walras 1954). Economics was “purified” during the 
following hundred years by eliminating economic knowledge which was – 
from then on – characterized as historical or sociological. Also this new para-
digm was formalized and represented in mathematical form. In the 1950s neo-
classical economic theory became the dominant economic paradigm and mod-
elled economy as a system of self-equilibrating markets. In the 1960s and 
1970s economic sociology became also a “purified” sub-discipline but the 
other way round and the analysis of markets, market behaviour and market 
rationality was almost entirely left to economics. In the 1980s economic soci-
ology renewed itself and began to bring sociological models into the so called 
“new economic sociology”. This label named the developments in the US 
American sociology. Seminal were the works of Harrison C. White, Mark S. 
Granovetter, Viviana A. Zelizer, and later on the works of Ronald S. Burt, Neil 
Fligstein, Joël M. Podolny and others. Social network structures and cultural 
practices were analyzed as constitutive principles for market structure.  
The notion of the “embeddedness” (of economic action into social networks 
and culture) has become a core concept in US-American new economic sociol-
ogy (Granovetter 1985).16 Originally this concept was coined against such a 
“purified economics”, which modelled its research object as a disembedded 
social sphere with its own form of rationalities and institutions. So the research 
in the field of economic sociology found the embeddedness-concept useful in 
the founding period when new economic sociology had to find its own position 
against neoclassical analysis of economic phenomena. And the embeddedness-
argument is in fact a classical concept in economic history which was intro-
duced by Karl Polanyi (1944) – although he used it to describe traditional 
economies as “embedded” in society. Granovetter reused this concept to argue 
that modern economies should also be conceived as social constructions and 
economic institutions should be conceived as still embedded in modern socie-
ties by network relations (Granovetter 1985, 1992). In the 1990s the new eco-
nomic sociology in the US was internationally recognized and received.17 To-
                                                             
16  See for an overview of the landscape of new economic sociology the edited volumes of 
Smelser and Swedberg (2005), Dobbin (2004), Guillén, Collins, England and Meyer 
(2002), Granovetter and Swedberg (2001). 
17  In Germany Jens Beckert and others started from the 1990s to review American new eco-
nomic sociology and to develop the German field of economic sociology (Beckert 1997, 
2002). See also the contributions in Beckert, Diaz-Bone, and Ganßmann (2007) and in 
Beckert and Deutschmann (2009).  
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gether with developments in the field of US-American organizational studies 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983) US-American sociology 
offered new theoretical and methodological perspectives on the interrelation 
between “economy and culture” which emphasized the cultural embeddedness 
of economic action and which extended the concept of culture to a concept for 
the analysis of everyday (economic) practices (DiMaggio 1994).18 
But there are two fundamental problems related to the way the embedded-
ness-concept is used in economic history. (1) The first problem is the danger of 
an implicit functionalism related to the application of this concept. In the 1990s 
this concept was criticized by economic sociologists themselves, because the 
reference to “embeddedness” (for example of the economy “in culture”) was 
used in studies as an implicit argument for positive effects which other social 
spheres exert on the economy. To avoid simplifying assumptions of positive 
effects of embeddedness Brian Uzzi had introduced the notions of overem-
beddedness and underembeddedness which characterize problematic effects of 
embeddedness (Uzzi 1996, 1997).19 (2) The second problem is that the US-
American new economic sociology was always in danger to be reduced to the 
embeddedness-concept when it is regarded from the perspective of economic 
history. Economic sociology and the US-American new economic sociology 
have never been one-issue approaches.20 It can easily be demonstrated that 
there were some more key concepts and innovative approaches in the early 
period of US-American new economic sociology.21 
From the perspective of economic sociology, there were original French 
contributions which were also innovative for economic sociology and were 
developed in the 1980s and 1990s – namely the contributions of Pierre 
Bourdieu,22 actor-network-theory (ANT) and the economics of convention 
                                                             
18  See for the notion of cultural embeddedness Beckert (2007, 6). 
19  See for a critical review Granovetter (2005), and Krippner and Alvarez (2007). 
20  A recent example is the article written by Nathaus and Gilgen (2011). The authors overes-
timate the role of this concept for present economic sociology. 
21  One early seminal paper – the article written by Harrison C. White “Where do markets 
come from” (White 1981) – presented a new sociological model of markets as networks 
which models markets as sets of (producers) positions who are structurally equivalent. 
These producers watch each other and seek to find unique quality niches in their markets, 
so they can place themselves on different positions in a market profile and they control real 
competition in the market – which they need to avoid if they want to make profits. White’s 
concept of structural equivalence and White’s market model became also key concepts. 
Viviana A. Zelizer has delivered since the 1970s a series of highly influential studies which 
demonstrate that the sphere of economy is founded on cultural and ethical everyday prac-
tices and – vice versa – how non-economic spheres (as intimacy or family relations) are 
economized (Zelizer 1978, 1979, 1985, 1994, 2005). Her studies were path breaking for the 
“culture and economy”-perspective. A new edited collection of her journal articles was re-
cently published (Zelizer 2011). 
22  His contributions to new economic sociology were translated into English after his death 
(Bourdieu 2005a, Bourdieu 2005b). 
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(EC). ANT and EC were developed in close connection to each other. While 
ANT was soon internationally recognized and appreciated in the field of the 
social studies of science, the discussion of EC remained for a long time almost 
constrained to French social sciences.23 Today, EC and ANT can be regarded as 
the French new economic sociologies which both reject the traditional division 
in sub-disciplines and which both integrate the analysis of cultural and eco-
nomic practices.24 Both reject the reduction of empirical complexity in theo-
retical modelling by using only one concept. For the EC-approach, the net-
work-model is only one of many conventions and the prominence of the 
embeddedness-concept risks the reduction of empirical complexity (Eymard-
Duvernay 2002, 2011). 
EC extended its research field and included the analysis of discursive prac-
tices and media (see for example Lamont and Thévenot 2000; Eymard-
Duvernay 2009). The inclusion of the analyses of culture and discourse became 
relevant because EC regards economic worlds (as the worlds of production) as 
normative orders (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Storper and Salais 1997).  
Economic history resisted the “purification” of neo-classical economics suc-
cessfully, and the works of scholars like Max Weber, Fernand Braudel, Karl 
Polanyi and nowadays Douglass C. North kept the integral character of eco-
nomic history as a combined historical analysis of economy, culture and soci-
ety.25 Sociological approaches which share this rejection of a pure economics, 
as EC does, are therefore allies for a renewed economic history – as Jürgen 
Kocka (2010) has outlined (see above). But from our point of view current 
historical research in economic history (outside of France) almost exclusively 
views US-American economic sociology when discussing the potentials of 
economic sociology and overlooks the contributions of the new French eco-
nomic sociology.26  
3.4 Objects and Instruments 
One of the main contributions of the new French social sciences – which are 
mainly represented by ANT and EC – is to demonstrate that objects and their 
                                                             
23  An important exception is the discussion between Harrison C. White and representatives of 
the EC-Approach about markets. This discussion became manifested in two volumes 
(Favereau and Lazega 2002; White 2002). Another important exception is the work of 
Pierre Bourdieu, which was highly appreciated as a genuine contribution to economic soci-
ology (Smelser and Swedberg 2005). 
24  For an overview on the French economic sociology see Heilbron (2001) and the contribu-
tions in Steiner and Vatin (2009). 
25  For this claim see also Beckert (2011). 
26  So does Sewell (2010) and also the contributions in HSR 36 (3) do ignore the French 
approaches of ANT and EC (Nathaus and Gilgen 2011; Eisenberg 2011). An exception out-
side of France is – again – Jürgen Kocka (2010). But see also the contribution from Judde 
de Larivière and Hanne (in this volume). 
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material properties have an important impact on and contribution to the way 
individuals coordinate, evaluate and produce. Interaction between human be-
ings and economic coordination entangle objects. Interaction and coordination 
therefore are to be conceived as interaction between human beings and objects 
and as coordination which is intentionally organized by means of objects. In 
the pragmatic perspective – as developed by Luc Boltanski and Laurent 
Thévenot (1987, 2006) – objects back up and proof the “worth” (grandeur) of 
persons and actions. They are also the reference for “tests”, when the worth of 
persons or actions is questioned in critical situations. Cognitive formats and 
objects are the non-human environment for convention-based coordination, 
itself the result of previous actions and investments, and they are part of the 
equipment of worlds (of production). Correctness (justesse) and justice of 
economic action will be evaluated in these worlds with reference to cognitive 
formats and especially to objects. That’s why research in the tradition of EC 
includes the analysis of the convention-based coordination between persons, 
cognitive formats and objects (Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal 1997; Bessy 
and Chauvin 2011; Marchal and Rieucau 2010).27 
Objects are part of the reality under study. But in the tradition of the EC ob-
jects are reflected as contributors to the scientific practices itself. The works of 
Pierre Bourdieu about the epistemological status of analytical tools (as scien-
tific methods and instruments)28 and their effects in co-constructing the scien-
tific object were highly influential for the founders of EC (which has one start-
ing point in the analysis of statistical practices of classification). Another object 
of study is therefore this effect of objects and instruments as scientific tools. 
Modern societies were coined during the course of some hundred years by this 
effect. The study of modern economies and its history (as the history of modern 
labor organization, the history of accounting, the history of financial govern-
ance and the history of official statistics)29 can be understood as the performa-
tivity of scientific methods and instruments on the economy through time.30 
Different conventions underlying scientific practices and the construction of 
scientific instruments (as statistical categories) perform differently in generat-
ing “data”.31 
                                                             
27  Economic history became also aware of the role of objects and material properties, for 
example in the historical analysis of consumption (Jeggle in this volume). 
28  Bourdieu continued as sociologist the French school of epistemology which was established 
by Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem and Michel Serres. 
29  See the contributions of Kädtler, Desrosières (in this volume) and Desrosières (2011). 
30  Michel Callon, co-founder of ANT, claimed that economy is not described by economics. 
Instead economics “performs” economy. He named this effect of economics “performativ-
ity” (Callon 1998). 
31  See the contributions of Alain Desrosières and Laurent Thévenot (in this volume). 
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4. How to Conceive Historical Processes? 
All disciplines have a dream. For economics this consists in finding the optimal 
economic system in order to provide prosperity for all. As it seems for us who 
are not historians, the dream for history is to break the wall erected by time and 
space distances. Under what conditions could the exchange and mutual under-
standing of past and present be possible? How could the origins and socio-
temporal dynamics in which the present roots be truthfully and transparently 
recreated? What makes such a dream utopia – nevertheless worth to be pursued 
– is not that we are not omniscient, due to lack or loss of archives or to biases 
for instance. These are real problems, but not essential. Would we have all the 
necessary information and data, they would not provide any access to knowl-
edge, except a wide mess of facts and statements from where no meaning could 
emerge.  
The very problem to build a meaning-full history, as hermeneutics helps us 
to understand, is the opacity that social objects opposed to historical works.32 
Along time, social objects have acquired a consistency of their own as well as 
autonomy with regards to intentions, values, knowledge incorporated in them 
in the original situation. Even more to the original layer of meaning, multiple 
and diverse layers have been added as sediments to accumulate and to be reor-
ganised. The whole leads to forgetting, misunderstanding, strategic justifica-
tion, sometimes manipulation, which opens the route to an indefinite plurality 
of possible historical narratives, all for the same domain, starting from the same 
material, while respecting criteria of scientific practice. 
To choose the type of narrative and the methodology for building facts de-
spite of such uncertainties and opacities, there are two broad sets of strategies. 
The first set, as exemplified by NHI, starts from some established theory or 
model and applies them to historical material. One will call it the external-view 
set. The second set, as promoted by the EC, starts from the plural ways along 
which people conceive, act, coordinate, realise, evaluate and deal with justifica-
tions. One will call it the internal-view set.33 The first set (the external view) is 
the more widespread one, thanks to the search for hegemony by mainstream 
economics. The second set (the internal view), a red line which goes through 
historiography (in economic history too), is exemplified by the contributions of 
this special issue. 
The major critique to be addressed to the first set of strategies is that their 
ultimate concern is not how to conceptualize, but about how to evaluate his-
torical processes and their outcomes from a normative point of view (in case of 
NHI from a given conception of economic performance). That makes a big 
                                                             
32  See the contribution of Salais (in this volume). 
33  Such a strategy for economic history is exemplified in this volume by the contributions of 
Christof Jeggle and Philippe Minard. 
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difference and creates huge problems with regards to the nature of so built 
knowledge and its objectivity. The consequence of applying from the external a 
grid framed by general categories and theories is that the historical narrative is 
inextricably intermingled with underlying normative evaluation. NHI-based 
historical narratives – implicitly or explicitly – are related to the good or the 
bad of behaviours or outcomes. With its foundational tools like the rational 
individual or the cost of transaction, the NHI is exemplary of such trends. This 
is not to say that such strategies do not produce useful facts, but facts which are 
tainted with pre-judgements which are no more questioned. For instance, be-
haviours, altruistic or oriented towards the common good, are not unseen by a 
framework centred on the rational individual, but are either reinterpreted and 
degraded to the status of refined strategic action, or considered as non eco-
nomical and basically inefficient. Or, economic institutions based on personal 
links or upon the assumption that people are capable of engagements34 are 
definitively supposed to create large costs of transaction and to be backward. 
Yet one can demonstrate that they prove highly efficient for systems of produc-
tion and markets relying upon specialised and dedicated products (one of the 
major international specialisations of the German economy which explains its 
success in exports).  
To be aware of the basic relevance of the above statements, one must ac-
knowledge that no theoretical system built from an external standpoint can be 
neutral in axiological terms (for a statement with regards to the EC, cf. Postel 
1998).35 It carries normative judgements, which orient the construction of facts 
by the researcher. Acknowledging the absence of axiological neutrality is for-
tunately rising in social sciences; but adverse trends continuously emerge in 
daily research practices, less from ideological or political grounds than from, 
one could say, axiological naïveté, which happens due to lack of reflexivity on 
his or her methodological practices or on the place of research within society. 
More will be said later, especially in regards to the constitution of quantitative 
data.36 It follows that, when applying such methodology, historians can, unbe-
knownst to most of them, become the spokesperson of prejudgments incorpo-
rated in the theoretical background, which they inadvertently enforce by the 
objective character of their narratives. As researchers aim at building knowl-
edge and not normative evaluation, what should we have to focus on making 
judgements about the economic efficiency of institutional systems? Many 
                                                             
34  The civic regime of engagement in Thévenot’s contribution (in this volume). 
35  Axiology relates to values judgments and their nature in knowledge, beliefs or action. By 
considering that institutions and their rules are socio-historically built (and not “natural”) or 
by founding the approach more on hermeneutics and its concept of interpretation than on 
cognitive sciences, the EC asserts its full awareness of the absence of axiological neutrality 
in human and social sciences. 
36  See also the contribution from Desrosières (in this volume). 
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empirical works of the economics of convention,37 as well as research based on 
the assumption of a plurality of national models,38 have extensively docu-
mented that there exists a plurality of theories and practices of economic effi-
ciency. These theories and practices rely upon a variety of modes of coordina-
tion, of quality conventions of products, of work or of financing (Rivaud-
Danset and Salais 1992), of specific sets of institutions. It is impossible to 
decide that some are better than others; for economies that specialise in one of 
these modes of coordination demonstrate in practice their absolute advantage in 
a series of specialisations on world markets, and economies that develop other 
modes of coordination gain advantage on other segments of world markets. For 
research to a priori decide of a specific and unique principle of evaluation of 
economic and social actions not only is unjustifiable, but also becomes an 
epistemological obstacle. 
From the point of view of scientific method and posture, much more impor-
tant and relevant is to start from the documented statement that, in any econ-
omy and society, several types of worth, several worlds exist, have existed in 
the past and will exist in the future. These types of worth and these worlds 
enter in socio-historical processes by which they hybrid each other, or juxta-
pose, conflict, establish into stable hierarchies, and so on. They create for ac-
tors repertoires of interpretation, action and evaluation of their own. Every 
order of worth (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006), every world of production 
(Storper and Salais 1997) behaves like a critique, in act and in justification, 
against the others. It follows that no one may be identified as better than others, 
which, at the end, disqualifies the set of strategies which starts from externally 
predefined optimal points of views. 
The other set of research strategies corresponds to the one advocated by the 
EC, that is precisely to start from the statement of plurality. Internal-view 
method and orientation are required in order to theoretically and methodologi-
cally grasp such an empirical statement. As we said earlier, we are convinced 
that such internal-view strategies are not uncommon in economic history and 
that we are joining similar debates within it. But it is up to historians who by 
definition master their field of research to tell us what the situation is in this 
respect. (That would be another theme for further dialogue between the eco-
nomics of convention and economic history in the future, beyond this HSR 
special issue.)  
A true internal-view strategy which starts from the assumption of a plurality 
requires firm and clear-cut principles. We will consider four of these principles 
relative to comprehensive approach (following Max Weber’s precepts), to the 
                                                             
37  See among others Eymard-Duvernay (1987), Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal (1997), Bessy 
(1993), Bessy, Eymard-Duvernay, de Larquier, and Marchal (2001), Salais and Storper 
(1993). 
38  A key example being the series of works pursuing Hall and Soskice (2001). 
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status of embeddedness, to processes of rising into generality and to the cogni-
tive status of data. 
(1) Using a Comprehensive Approach 
Being and living in an “elsewhere” foreign to external predefined points of 
view, persons and actors have no reason to conform themselves to the general 
categories and concepts as forged by these points of view. Equally they have no 
reason to segment their activities into domains as postulated and institutional-
ized by academic knowledge and institutions. “Economic” action cannot be 
reduced to the limits of accordingly institutionalized domains. Economic ac-
tions as other so-called types of action mobilise interests, values, common 
goods well beyond instrumental rationality, well beyond the “market” as for-
malised by economic theory. To nevertheless grasp these actions and coordina-
tion as they are, conceived by people and achieved, the only valuable strategy 
is an approach in comprehension. Such a strategy is neither bottom-up, nor top-
down. Methodology must respect and follow the ontological claims made in 
theory about actors and situations.39 Then it has to be “situated”, which means 
for the researcher to position herself/himself within the situation of coordina-
tion as developed by actors, in order to discover the conventions they use, their 
role in the coordination. That is the way, too, to grasp how general categories 
and discursive justifications are mobilised, to understand how institutions are 
present in the situation, how they interact with conventions. 
(2) The Status of Embeddedness 
As the discussion of the “economy and culture”-perspective and of the concept 
of embeddedness demonstrated, there is no separate social sphere called “the 
economy” with its own social laws. The original thinking on embeddedness 
implicitly assumes the existence of spheres in the sense that spheres are like 
Russian puppets. One needs to “re-pragmatize” the concept. 
Economic institutions are not external to economic action and coordination. 
Economic institutions are endogenous to pragmatic interaction. For EC, in that 
sense one can say that economic institutions are “embedded” in convention-
based coordination processes of competent actors in situations (Bessy and 
Favereau 2003; Salais 1998; Diaz-Bone 2009a). These actors face a radical 
plurality of conventions present in situations. Embeddedness cannot be reduced 
to a unique logic of coordination (as networks or a single cultural frame). Re-
searchers have to study how actors in situations cope with this plurality (how 
they manage to build up and stabilize compromises between conventions) or 
                                                             
39  See the contribution of Diaz-Bone (in this volume). 
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how actors refer to different conventions in situations of critique and conflict. 
But the situation is even more complex to historical analysis.  
First, actors rely on cognitive formats and social objects for coordination. 
Cognitive formats are the result of foregoing processes of investment in forms 
and social objects have traces of foregoing convention-based coordination. 
Most economic action therefore could be thus said as embedded in an already 
“equipped” environment. Second – as Laurent Thévenot (2006) has worked out 
– situations underlie another form of complexity. Actors refer to conventions in 
the process of coordination with others (and with their environment), but they 
are also engaged with their personal environment. Thévenot speaks in his con-
tribution of different “regimes of engagement”.40 The embeddedness of action 
therefore is more complex than traditionally assumed.  
(3) Focussing on Processes of Rising into Generality 
In an internal-view comprehensive and situated approach, general concepts and 
categories cannot be treated like natural facts, institutional evidence or scien-
tific statements. Their emergence is a socio-historical fact which has to be dealt 
with by research. Through which process of rising into generality have general 
concepts and categories developed and been established? This has been well 
documented for some of them, especially in French research, but not only 
there. Unemployment as a general category and conceptualization appeared 
only recently, that is after the Second World War (Salais, Baverez, and 
Reynaud 1986). “Before”, lacks of work were differently conceived. Further-
more, for unemployment such rising into generality has taken specific national 
forms, depending on the conceptions of the state: truly abstract and general for 
France; marked by federalism and subsidiarity in Germany; paradoxically 
constrained in Great-Britain by strategies of political containments aiming at 
impeding any rise into generality for social problems. The same could be said 
for the category and conceptualisation of the market: quasi “indigenous” in 
Great-Britain; strongly refrained in its generality, even today, in France (in 
behalf of the primacy of state intervention) and in Germany (in behalf of the 
respect of basic social and public order).41 Instead of inferring from such dif-
ferences judgements over backwardness of French and German economies, one 
must search to shed light on the configurations and circumstances that gener-
ated such national processes and on how they are the sources of specific eco-
nomic performance. 
                                                             
40  See also Thévenot (2007, 2011), Diaz-Bone and Thévenot (2010), and the contribution of 
Thévenot (in this volume). 
41 See the contribution of Salais (in this volume). 
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(4) Data are not Given Facts 
Not only actors do not conform their practices to theories built upon them, but 
even more institutions can borrow as justifications and rules some of the char-
acteristics, orientations or formalisation from these theories. Data issued from 
institutional practices end up incorporating their normative framework. They 
could no longer be considered as given facts providing immediate and true 
access to the social reality. For instance, one cannot understand the data on 
judgments by the European Court of Justice if one does not take into account 
its recent inspiration by the neoclassical theory of perfect competition.  Histori-
ans who take this data at their face value will conclude to degrading competi-
tiveness conditions, due to a series of social rigidities, while data merely re-
flects the changing normative framework by European judges. Presumably the 
same could be said of judgments by US courts which take their frameworks 
from neo-institutional theories. Information drawn from US jurisprudence is 
more about its underlying normative framework than about the real functioning 
of markets in the US. The methodological trap for historians and, more gener-
ally, for research is to be locked in a self-referential loop. Though they believe 
to have created true knowledge about the real world, they are in fact only re-
discovering normative judgements already included in the judicial data they 
use. 
More generally one must be aware that cognitive tools, especially statistical 
instruments, do not merely provide data. First and foremost, by pre-cutting 
reality into domains, by including and excluding, by qualifying and categoris-
ing, they shape and build information in some direction and with some underly-
ing normative conceptions. So doing, they are taking part in the building of 
social realities (Desrosières 2005, 2011; Salais 2007). This means that social 
processes of producing data (in economies at different times and places) must 
be considered as a key empirical material to be observed and analysed by re-
search, especially by historians. Cognitive tools used by actors, institutions, 
national statistical apparatuses say more – via their conception, their technical 
rules, the debates on their implementation and underlying principles – about 
frameworks of interpretation and action used by actors and about the transfor-
mations of the real they induce than the data they produce. For instance, today 
but also before the Second World War, the rate of unemployment and its dis-
parities by sex, age, profession, territory tell us more about the evolution of 
work conceptions and the extent to which the institutional and cognitive cate-
gory “unemployment” has been diffused among population than about the 
intensity of a supposed naturalised social fact.  
So the dreamed objective to reconstruct the meaning of historical processes, 
especially in economic history, cannot be achieved, but must be pursued and 
approximated as close as possible through transdisciplinary analysis. The chal-
lenge set by this special issue is to develop, thanks to the contributors, the 
potentialities of the EC for that purpose. 
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5. Contributions in this Special Issue 
We editors invited some of the most visible researchers in the field of historical 
analysis of conventions to contribute to the present issue. We gathered an in-
ternational group of contributors and contributed ourselves. All in all we col-
lected nine articles which discuss current research topics in this field and some 
of them reflect developments and structures of the field itself. The collection of 
contributions illustrates the transdisciplinary character of the EC-approach and 
it illustrates its conceptual complexity – irreducible to only one concept (as 
convention). We will introduce them here with some sentences. 
The first contribution is methodological in character. In his contribution 
(“The methodological standpoint of the Économie des conventions”) Rainer 
Diaz-Bone (University of Lucerne) tries to trace the influences of structuralism 
and pragmatism on the methodological position of the EC-approach. He argues 
that a methodic holism is underlying EC. Methodic holism claims that the 
applied methodology has to respect the assumptions (made by the theory) about 
the ontology of the object under study. Methods, ontological and theoretical 
claims must be compatible. So one cannot take theories and apply them to pre-
given data, “data are not given facts” (see above), they are the results of social 
theories employed in social research or incorporated into institutional rules and 
practices. More precisely, the methodological standpoint of EC can be labelled 
as “complex pragmatist situationalism”. EC focuses situations as units of 
analysis, because in situations actors are placed in a social environment, which 
is equipped with objects and cognitive formats. The situation is always com-
plex because there is a plurality of possible ways how to evaluate and to inter-
act. EC investigates – thereby starting from the actor’s perspective – how ac-
tors interact in these complex situations to achieve a common goal. This 
methodology is sketched out in his contribution. He discusses methodological 
positions shared between EC and the socio-historical approach of Max Weber. 
Both approaches have to reconstruct socio-economic frames of references as 
kinds of Weberian ideal types. But there are also differences to the Weberian 
approach – as the assumed complexity and plurality of logics of action. Diaz-
Bone highlights that the methodological position of EC collapses traditional 
dualisms like the dualism between methodological individualism and methodo-
logical holism or the dualism of subject and object (which EC regards as inter-
related in coordination processes). This rejection is part of the pragmatic posi-
tion of EC. 
Alain Desrosières (INSEE, Paris) has contributed to the EC from its begin-
nings. In his article “The economics of convention and statistics: The paradox 
of origins” he reflects on the development of this approach. But first he focuses 
on foregoing (and for the EC-approach seminal) research, done at the INSEE in 
Paris, on social classifications, on the procedures of codification and on the 
statistical classification practices. The work of Pierre Bourdieu, Luc Boltanski, 
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Laurent Thévenot, Robert Salais and Alain Desrosières on classification prac-
tices was path breaking for EC. According to Desrosières, the major innovation 
developed at the INSEE in the 1970s and the 1980s (Affichard 1977, 1987) has 
been the methodological reflexivity on the conventional and social-
constructivist basis of statistical categories and statistical instruments. He also 
portrays the institutional and intellectual setting out of which EC then emerged 
in the 1980s. His article is an important reflection on the continuities of re-
search topics in the EC-approach – especially research on statistical instru-
ments, statistical practices, and more general on the politics of quantification 
which are relevant research topics until today.  
In their collective contribution “Occupational naming conventions: historic-
ity, actors, interactions” Claire Judde de Larivière and Georges Hanne (both 
University of Toulouse) apply the EC-approach in their historical analysis of 
the creation processes of occupational titles and socio-occupational categories. 
Referring to the works of Alain Desrosières, Luc Boltanski and Robert Salais 
they point to the importance of naming processes for the achievement of social 
status, the establishment of occupational groups, which they treat as linguistic 
and discursive constructions. They reconstruct the genealogy of French occupa-
tional categories through the course of different epochs. Thereby they can show 
how occupational names and socio-occupational categories are constructed as 
linguistic conventions, which are institutionalized by actors (as governmental 
actors, trade unions, but also private actors) in pragmatic negotiations. As some 
of the other contributions in this volume do, this contribution proofs that there 
is no necessity to bifurcate historical analysis in two strands: cultural historical 
analysis (after the discursive turn) or economic historical analysis. This contri-
bution exemplifies the “economy and culture”-perspective as grounded on the 
EC-approach and as a promising perspective also for economic history. 
The study of quality conventions is a core element of the EC (Eymard-
Duvernay 1989). Bert De Munck (University of Antwerp) applies the concept 
of quality conventions to the analysis of early modern guild’s regulations of 
product quality. In his contribution “Guilds, product quality and intrinsic value. 
Towards a history of conventions?” De Munck analyzes the relation between 
conventions and institutions and its transformation, which he calls epistemo-
logical transformations. His contribution exemplifies – as the one delivered by 
Judde de Larivière and Hanne – a viable combination of convention theory and 
discourse analysis. He examines the discursive investments into a specific 
quality convention “intrinsic value”, which became a dispositive for guild-
based manufacturing artisans to link their political power in the city of Antwerp 
to the value of their products. 
Christof Jeggle (University of Bamberg) presents in the article “Pre-
industrial worlds of production: Conventions, institutions and organizations” 
his research about the linen production in the German town of Münster (in 
Westphalia). He reports the reception of the EC-approach by French historical 
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scientist since the early 1990s ad argues that the import of EC offers solutions 
to long discussed problems in economic history. For Jeggle the EC approach 
helps avoiding the use of the opposition between traditional economies and 
modern societies. This opposition biases the historical analysis by implicitly 
ascribing “traditional” (“premodern”) characteristics to traditional economies. 
Jeggle applies the model of worlds of production, which was developed by 
Robert Salais and Michael Storper (1993) to describe the emerging linen pro-
duction in Münster in the 16th and 17th century. This production was pre-
industrial but highly dynamic and coordinated by three different worlds of 
production having their own quality conventions. 
Philippe Minard (University Paris VIII) investigates the conflicts between 
different trades in the leather branch in London in the 18th century. Some of 
the leather trades contested existing quality conventions. Minard shows in his 
contribution (“Micro-economics of quality and social construction of the mar-
ket: Disputes among the London leather trades in the Eighteenth-Century”) the 
micro-physics of these conflicts about the quality definition and about the 
procedure how to control them. He focuses on the actors play with rules as well 
as on the actors play on rules (which is a classical analytic perspective of the 
EC; cf. Salais and Thévenot 1986, 4). Thereby he highlights the role of conflict 
and power, but in an innovative way that results from his focus on quality 
conventions. Institutional change proceeds, not simply from competition or 
from changing hierarchies of power between actors, but basically from the 
passage from a former quality convention, which he calls “regulated quality”, 
to a form of “deliberated quality”. Such convention-based historical approach 
demonstrates that the traditional and teleological narrative about the ineluctable 
victory of liberal reason over archaic regulations cannot account for actual 
changes in the 18th British markets, at least for that trade, which pleads for 
developing such approach in other trades, products and countries.  
Jürgen Kädtler (SOFI, University of Göttingen) focuses on the current 
global crisis, which, according to him, are due to the fact that financial rational-
ity has established itself now as generic economic rationality. He investigates 
the process of financialisation in his contribution “Financialisation of capitalist 
economies – bargaining on conventional economic rationalities”. When decid-
ing of their economic choices, actors in firms enter practical negotiations that 
confront different competing narratives, the most powerful one being based, 
now, on financial rationality, the other ones coming from product and markets 
strategies. Hence the cognitive, as well as normative and practical compromises 
(the conventional foundation of firms’ choices) became dominated by financial 
rationality. This leads to the substitution of simple and immediate cost-cutting 
to investments in production and internal services, which constitutes a key 
difference from the 1930’s crisis. The current crisis is, furthermore, misinter-
preted in dominant economic and political discourses, as the crisis of financial 
markets (which leads to proposals to refine their functioning), while its core 
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lies in the increasing power of creative interpretations and narratives based on 
standard financial criteria and benchmarking in the whole economy.  
When statistical instruments and statistical data are conceived as conven-
tional, then different ways are imaginable, on how human characteristics can be 
measured in social surveys. Laurent Thévenot (INSEE/EHESS, Paris) explores 
(in his contribution “Conventions for measuring and questioning policies. The 
case of 50 years of policy evaluations through a statistical survey”) the differ-
ent ways the French survey “Formation et qualification professionnelle” (FQP) 
historically changed its conventional basis for statistical measurement of these 
issues from 1964 to 2003. His research on the politics of statistics carries for-
ward the research tradition of EC on statistical classifications and statistical 
practices. Thévenot recapitulates the analysis of the relation between “statis-
tics” and policies the EC has done since the 1960s. He also inquires the interre-
lations of how people are taken into account by policies, by statistical surveys 
and in social sciences (as sociology and political science). He identifies four 
configurations how policy constructions, statistical tools, and social sciences 
are interrelated. Thévenot combines the different “orders of worth” (as intro-
duced by Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) and different “forms of engagements” 
(as introduced by Thévenot 2006) to investigate the different forms and levels 
of relevance, the politics of statistics has for groups and individuals. 
The last contribution in the present volume combines conceptual as well as 
empirical developments. In his article (“Labor-related conventions and con-
figurations of meaning: France, Germany and Great Britain prior to the Second 
World War”) Robert Salais (École Normale Supérieure de Cachan) introduces 
the concepts of trace and configuration of meaning as theoretical tools to pre-
pare a perspective for the historical hermeneutics of conventions. Conventions 
materialize into social objects and leave traces which then can be interpreted 
(by social hermeneutics) as Salais demonstrates in the empirical part of his 
article. His research focuses conventions for the definition and the evaluation 
of labor, as interpreted and incorporated in social objects like labor institutions 
or economic thought. He shows that labor cannot be evaluated but by taking 
into account the different moments of the work process. These stages are the 
process of hiring (Moment 1), the coordination in the work process (Moment 2) 
and the realization of labor in kind of the product quality as it is perceived on 
the market (Moment 3). The comparison between France, Germany and Great 
Britain demonstrates three different national configurations of meaning and in 
this way the historical contingent forms how labor is evaluated and institution-
alized. The contribution of Salais offers evidence of the socio-historical ante-
cedence of conventions to institutions.  
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